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ON THERMAL STRESS FAILURE OF THE SNAP-19A
RTG HEAT SHIELD
William C. Pitts and Lewis A. Anderson
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
Results are presented of a study pertaining to thermal stress problems in
an amorphous graphite heat shield that is part of the launch-abort protect
system for the SNAP-19A Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) that will
be used on the Viking Mars Lander. The first result is from a thermal stress
analysis of a full-scale RTG heat source that failed to survive a suborbital
entry flight test, possibly due to thermal stress failure. It was calculated
that the maximum stress in the heat shield was only 50 percent of the ultimate
strength of the material. To provide information on the stress failure cri-
terion used for this calculation, some heat-shield specimens were fractured
under abort entry conditions in a plasma arc facility. It was found that in
regions free of stress concentrations the POCO graphite heat-shield material
did fracture when the local stress reached the ultimate uniaxial stress of the
material.
INTRODUCTION
There are certain space missions for which nuclear energy is the only
feasible source of electrical power. For example, the Pioneer-Jupiter missions
traveled so far from the Sun that solar energy was precluded as a possible
source of electrical power, and the duration of the mission was too great for
the use of batteries or fuel cells. Consequently, Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTG) were chosen as the sole source of electrical power. RTGs were
also chosen as the electrical power source for the Viking Mars Lander because
they_were_deemed less vulnerable to the unknown meteorological conditions on
the Martian surface. ~
The use of a nuclear power source in space presents a serious potential
hazard in that an early mission abort could disseminate radioactive material
into the Earth atmosphere. The current philosophy among engineers concerned
with space nuclear safety is to.avoid this possibility by enclosing the heat
source, which contains the nuclear material, in a protective container called
the heat shield. The shield must be able to survive blast pressure, fragment
impact, fuel fires, and the high heating rates and temperature encountered
during atmospheric entry after an abort. These heating rates can be very high
because there is no way to control the velocity or the steepness of descent
after an abortion.
The container, therefore, must be made of an ablative, refractory material,
which also must be sufficiently heat conductive to allow normal RTG operation.
POCO graphite meets these requirements and has been selected as the heat-shield
material for the SNAP-19 RTG. Carbon phenolic or elastomeric materials, which
have advantages for the lower temperature environment of controlled atmospheric
entry, cannot survive the high temperatures. It was shown in reference 1 that
a POCO graphite heat shield for the SNAP-19 RTG heat source can safely contain
the fuel until Earth impact for the reentry conditions after a Nimbus B abort.
In an evaluation of the suitability of a material for the heat shield, one
of the most crucial factors for aborted missions is the ability of the material
to withstand thermal shock. Much work was done to assess the ability of POCO
graphite to withstand thermal shock as the heat-shield material of the SNAP-19
RTGs for the Pioneer-Jupiter missions (ref. 2). In reference 2 it was shown
by numerical calculations that a POCO graphite heat shield could survive most
of the expected conditions for entry after abort for this mission, but for
some combinations of high velocity and steep descent, cracks were predicted to
form on the inner surface of the heat shield because of excessive thermal
stress.
The question was raised, but not answered, about whether these cracks
would propagate to cause a catastrophic failure of the heat shield. Another
unknown factor was the value of the stress concentration factor to be used for
the threads at the ends of the heat source. A third uncertainty was the cri-
terion to be used to relate the calculated thermal stresses to the condition
for material cracking or failure. Because amorphous graphite is a brittle
material, the common maximum normal stress criterion for brittle material was
used. This criterion states that failure will occur whenever the local normal
stress exceeds the uniaxial strength of the material. However, some experts
feel that a thermal stress is a"""secondary stress," which implies that the
stress must exceed the stated criterion before thermal stress failure will
occur.
In view of the uncertainties in predicting thermal stress failure
conditions and the lack of experimental data, a full-scale SNAP-19 heat source
model was placed on the HAVE SINEW-1 test flight along with five other heat
source models (ref. 3). During this flight, the six models were released at
an altitude of 94 km. Four of the heat sources survived entry and were
recovered, but the other two, including the SNAP-19 heat source, were never
found. Evidence shows that at least one of the missing heat sources broke up
in flight, but the evidence does not show which of the two it was. There is
the possibility that the second missing model landed outside the search area,
but more likely it too broke up in flight. The reason for failure in flight
has not been established but there are several possibilities including improper
release from the payload adapter, excessive vibrations, and thermal stress
failure. Thermal stress failure is cited in reference 3 as the most likely
cause.
This discussion is directed to the question of thermal stress failure of
the SNAP-19A RTG heat shield. The SNAP-19A RTG, which is very similar to the
SNAP-19 RTG, is to be the electric power source for the Viking Mars Lander.
In the first part of the paper the results of a thermal stress analysis are
presented for the SNAP-19 heat source model during its HAVE SINEW-1 flight.
Then, the results of an experimental and theoretical analysis are presented
for SNAP-19A heat shields -that were thermally fractured in a plasma jet that
simulated flight abort conditions.
GENERAL ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
The finite-element model used for thermal analysis is shown in figure 1.
It is a two-dimensional cross section of the heat source of the SNAP-19A RTG
Figure 1.- Finite-element model used in CINDA thermal analysis.
shown in figure 2. Due to symmetry, only half of the model need be considered.
The portion outside the gap is the abort reentry heat shield made of POCO
graphite AXF-Q1. The .inner portion will be either the Pioneer heat source
configuration or a graphite cylinder. The validity of using this two-
dimensional model to analyze the Pioneer heat source is discussed in reference
2, where it is concluded that good accuracy will be obtained for the center
sections of the Pioneer heat source if the two-dimensional model is used.
There will be some error near the ends of the heat source, but this will be
small compared to the uncertainty created by the stress concentration due to
-the-threads (fig._ 2). Because analysis, of jthese stress concentrations was
beyond the scope of this study, the two-dimensional model was deemed adequate
for present purposes.
The thermal analysis for this study was performed using the CINDA-3G
code (Chrysler Improved Numerical Differencing Analyzer for 3rd Generation
Computers, ref. 4). CINDA is a general code that has great flexibility and
can handle problems of nearly unlimited complexity. For the present problem,
the program accounts for aerodynamic heating, ablation, subsonic convection,
radiation, and conduction, all in the manner described in references 2 and 5.
The procedures for providing the aerodynamic, heating input are discussed later
in connection with specific problems.
The two-dimensional, finite-element model used for the stress analysis
is similar to that used for the thermal analysis except that only the reentry
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Figure 2.- SNAP-19A heat source.
heat shield is considered and the element size is much smaller. The front
portion (flow stagnation region) of this model is shown in figure 3. The
remainder of the model is made up of rectangular elements about the size of
those on the right side of the figure.
Gas flow
Stagnation point
Figure 3.- Finite-element model used in NASTRAN stress analysis.
The stress analysis for this model was performed using the NASTRAN
finite-element program (ref. 6). The model temperature distributions obtained
from the CINDA thermal stress analysis were used as input to the NASTRAN
program to calculate the thermal stresses. Aerodynamic pressure forces and,
where applicable, inertial forces were also included in the stress analysis,
but these forces were found to produce negligible stresses compared to the
thermal stresses.
HAVE SINEW-1 STRESSES
As stated in the Introduction and in reference 3, two of the HAVE SINEW-1
models were not recovered, possibly because they broke up due to thermal
stress failure. A preliminary test had indicated that thermal failure was not
likely, but no quantitative stress analyses had been made. A two-dimensional
stress analysis has now been made using the models shown in figures I and 3;
results are shown in figure 4. The
maximum stresses occur near the
stagnation region, so only the stress
pattern in that region of the model
is shown. Lines of constant stress
ratio (local stress/ultimate stress
at local temperature) are super-
imposed on the model profile. The
stress is compressive near the front
and tensile near the inner portion
„. .
 T . _ . of the model, but nowhere does itFigure 4.- Lines of constant stress
 exceed 5Q rcent Q£ ultimate
ratio (local stress/ultimate stress
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 stress ratio Q£ valid cr-_
dimensional portion of HAVE SINEW-1
 terion £or failure> thermal stress
failure is not predicted in the mid-
section of the heat source. However, failure is possible near the ends where
the threads cause stress concentrations. For failure to occur, either the
stress concentration factor at the ends must be the order of 2 or the stress
ratio is not a proper failure criterion. The latter possibility is discussed
further in the remainder of the paper.
THERMAL STRESS TEST
To examine the thermal stress fracture criterion several sections of
POCO AXF-Q1 graphite were thermally fractured in the Ames 6-cm Plasma Arc. A
typical specimen assembly is shown in figure 5. The hexagonal cross section
of the specimen is that of a full-size replica of the reentry heat shield of
a SNAP-19A heat source (figs. 1 and 2). It is 8.9 cm across the flats. Two
of the sections are 1 cm wide and the other is 2 cm wide. These three sections
are supported at the ends by solid hexagonal cylinders of graphite and in the
center by a thick circular cylinder of graphite. Four wire spacers form the
0.15-cm gap shown in figure 1. This entire assembly is mounted on a
stainless-steel tube, which is used to support the model in the plasma arc
facility.
*
Figure 5.- Model assembly after run showing crack pattern and
extent of plasma coverage.
The assembly shown in figure 5 was subjected to a stagnation cold wall
heating rate of about 8 kw/cm* for 0.89 sec. Nitrogen gas was used in the
arc to avoid oxidation of the graphite. The size of the plasma jet can be
seen from the ring pattern on the face of the specimen assembly. The enthalpy
is not uniform across the entire jet, but it is reasonably uniform within the
black spot region in figure 5. The specimen temperature was monitored at two
points during the run. The inside surface temperature was measured with a
thermocouple cemented to the inner surface, and the stagnation point tempera-
ture was measured with an optical pyrometer that viewed in the 8000 to 8050 A
wavelength range. For this range, the plasma stream is transparent.
Two of the three specimens (fig. 5) cracked during the test. These
cracks are shown in figure 6, which is a closeup of figure 5. The crack in
the 2-cm-wide specimen penetrated the entire depth of the specimen; the crack
in the 1-cm specimen, however, stopped about 0.1 cm from the inner surface, as
shown in figure 7. The straight line behind the inner surface is a 0.075-cm-
diam wire placed there for size comparison purposes.
A total of four heat-shield sections were run under similar conditions.
In addition to the three sections shown in figure 5, a 4-cm wide specimen was
run. It did not crack. The fact that some but not all the specimens cracked
suggests that the test conditions produced threshold thermal stresses for
fracture; actual fracture depended on the variation of material properties
among specimens.
Figure 6.- Closeup of cracks from front view, figure 5,
Figure 7.- Side view of crack in 1-cm-thick specimen,
THERMAL STRESS ANALYSIS
A thermal stress anal/sis for the specimen in figure 7 was made to
determine the stress ratio in the material at the crack site. Because only
an approximate, average value of the model heating rate was measured, the
first step in the analysis was to determine a better value for this quantity
as a function of time. This was done by trial-and-error tailoring of the
approximate heating rate until the temperature calculated using CINDA agreed
with the measured values at the stagnation point and inner surface of the
specimen for the full time of the run. The resulting heating rate variation
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with time is shown in figure 8,
together with the temperatures cal-
culated using this heating rate. The
measured temperatures are also shown.
The calculated stagnation tempera-
ture is quite sensitive to the choice
of heating rate. The fact that the
calculated inner surface temperature
is higher than the measured value is
reasonable both because the mounting
cement for the thermocouple
restricted heat transfer to the
junction and the lead wires conducted
heat away from the junction.
Figure 8.- Temperature history match
between measured and calculated
values of specimen temperatures.
The heat-shield stresses were
then calculated using the NASTRAN
program with the temperature output from CINDA and the finite-element model of
figure 3. Stresses were calculated for several times during the test run, and
the maximum stress was found to occur on a rather flat maximum between 0.05
and 0.07 sec into the run, which corresponds to the time of the first peak in
stagnation temperature in figure 8. The calculated temperature distribution
is shown in figure 9 at t = 0.06 sec. The stress field for that same time is
presented in figure 10 in the stress-ratio form. The normalizing stress is
the average ultimate stress for POCO AXF-Q1 at the local specimen temperature.
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Figure 9.- Calculated temperature
profiles in specimen at t = 0.06
sec, °K.
Figure 10.- Crack and calculated stress
contours in specimen at time of maxi-
mum thermal stress, t = 0.06 sec.
The crack'that formed in the specimen (fig. 7) is superimposed on the
calculated stress field. The stress shown is the principal stress with maxi-
mum magnitude. The axis of this principal stress is within 2° of being normal
to the front surface. The stress parallel to the front surface is nearly zero
everywhere so that the stress field is essentially uniaxial. The stress nor-
mal to the front surface is zero as required by boundary conditions because a
surface cannot support a stress perpendicular to itself. The stress ratio
rises rapidly behind the stagnation point to a value of 1.0 for a small
distance from the centerline.
Interestingly, the experimentally observed crack passes through the
stress ratio equal to 1.0 line. In all probability, the crack initiated near
8
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this intersection because in the tension region the maximum local stress is
only 50 percent of the ultimate stress of POCO. It might not be expected a
priori that a crack would initiate in a region of compressive stress, but it
is possible. If a crack is located in a region of uniaxial compression, as in
figure 11, the shearing force along the crack can cause large tensile stresses
along the crack surface near its
tip. In reference 7, Hoek and
Bieniawski discuss in detail the
conditions for propagation of a
small crack under a compressive
load. They conclude that the only
way that a crack can propagate to
the point of specimen failure under
a purely compressive load is if the
loading is uniaxial. They also
conclude that the crack will form
parallel to the compressive stress
direction. Both of these conditions
prevail in the present example.
Tension
Tension
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Figure 11.- Form of stress variation
around crack in plate under
uniaxial compression. Because the maximum stress
ratio calculated for the specimens
of this study is 1.0, the conditions of the experiment are predicted to be
marginal for failure, if the stress ratio is a proper stress failure criterion.
That the test conditions were threshold values for thermal failure was also
indicated by the experimental data. Of the four specimen run under similar
conditions, two cracked during the run and two survived. For the other speci-
men that failed, the crack was very similar in form and location to the one
discussed above, except that it continued to the inner surface, completely
severing the specimen.
CONCLUSIONS
The SNAP-19 (Pioneer/Viking) RTG heat source model was lost during the
HAVE SINEW-1 flight, possibly due to thermal stress failure of the heat shield.
_A thermal^sjtress^^calculation _was jnade_for this model for the conditions experi-
enced in the HAVE SINEW-1 flight, and it was"found "that~ the~TnaYimunTthermal
stresses were only about half the ultimate thermal stress capability of the
heat-shield material, POCO AXF-Q1. Therefore, for thermal stress failure to
have occurred, either the stress concentration factor for the end threads must
be the order of 2, or the stress failure criterion used was not correct.
The stress failure criterion was examined as the second part of this
study. Sections of a full-scale SNAP-19A heat shield were subjected to a
reentry type environment. Under essentially the same conditions two of the
specimens failed and two survived, which indicated a threshold condition
existed for thermal stress failure. A thermal stress analysis of the model
for the test conditions also indicated a marginal condition for failure
because the local stress was equal to the ultimate stress of the material in
the vicinity of the crack. Thus, for POCO graphite at least, a value of 1.0
for the ratio of local stress to ultimate stress seems to be a reasonable
stress criterion when there are no stress concentrations due to irregularities
such as threads or holes.
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, Calif. 94035, May 21, 1974
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